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Armenia has had very low inflation (decreasing year after year) for almost 4 years, stable domestic 
currency, average level of budget deficit and GDP growth. This is considered proof that reforms are going 
in the right direction and financial stability has been achieved, an efficient market economy has been 
created and all preconditions for strong economic growth and investment flow to Armenia have been 
established. But what we see now in reality is strong economic stagnation, very low levels of investment 
activity, acute social problems and problems of poverty, which go contrary to what one of the major official 
macroeconomic indicators show - permanent GDP growth from year to year. (see Table below)  
What are the reasons and how can the real economic situations be explained?  
Armenia seems to implement reforms step-by-step as recommended by leading international financial 
institutions, but all it has in the plus, at this stage, is a number of macroeconomic indicators. What still 
remains unsettled (regarding only economic issues) are problems of mass unemployment, very low 
standards of living and purchasing power, huge foreign trade deficit, fast growing external debt, low foreign 
direct and portfolio investments, low investment activity, corruption, and many other issues. Actually, many 
economic problems in Armenia often have non-economic roots but in this article we will concentrate only 
on the economic causes.  
To determine the reasons why reforms didn't bring the expected results, we need to understand what 
Armenia is nowadays, and to classify the root causes of the economic issues:  
• Armenia is a country in transition. This makes Armenia a subject of comparative analysis with 
other transition countries, post-socialist countries and republics of the former Soviet Union. 
Countries in this group have many similar socio- economic issues and many of them have 
implemented reforms based on recommendations by international financial institutions.  
• Unsettled historical and social issues for Armenians. Human, societal and state development as 
well as historical issues have a big impact on economic processes, and exist in contemporary 
Armenian society in the form of numerous stable and self-developing complexes, inefficient 
norms of behaviour and understanding both in Armenia, the Diaspora and between them.  
 
The focus of this article is on the first aspect, which makes Armenia a part of a world in transition. 
However, the second aspect correlates strongly with the first, and is perhaps not less important in terms of 
understanding the reasons of negative political, social, economic and societal processes that take place in 
Armenia.  
 
Economic reforms in transition countries can be divided into achievement of 5 major economic tasks:  
 
• financial stabilization (low inflation and budget deficit, stable prices and exchange rate);  
• liberalization of economy (prices, economic links, foreign trade);  
• privatization;  
• structural adjustment of the economy;  
• acceptance of the reforms, new institutions by the society, and creation of new stable norms of 
behaviour.  
 
These are all economic tasks, of which the first three can be reached in a short-term perspective while the 
last two points require a longer time frame and a much more detailed approach, because they deal with 
evolutional issues and changing of the mentality of people and their norms of behaviour - the last point is a 
very difficult process which can't be reached only by economic measures. It deals with political and social, 
as well as historical and cultural issues. The first three stages can be done based on some technical 
approach, while the last two deal with an adaptive approach towards problems.  
 
The reforms in transition countries were implemented based on Washington Consensus principles 
(financial stabilization, liberalization and privatization), that was established by the IMF and USA economic 
elite in 1970s for Latin America countries that traditionally suffered from hyperinflation and huge budget 
deficits. It was concerned with the maximum deregulation of the economy and decreasing the role of the 
state to monetary and fiscal policies, their integration in world economic processes such as globalization 
and international organizations. Later on, those principles were accepted as a "guidebook for reformers" in 
many transition countries and implemented at different speeds and intensity.  
 
The practice of the recent 3 years as well as financial crisis of the developing and transition economies in 
1997-1999 has shown that this scheme does not cover the whole basket of economic problems and brings 
too many negative processes, disproportions in the economic development of these countries. It has 
clearly proved that many social-economic processes in transition countries are new and unique and not 
covered by existing economic theories and approaches.  
 
In fact, the whole concept of reforms in transition countries was brought to a simplified scheme in which 
the first three stages should be achieved within a very short-term (shock-therapy) and after reaching 
financial stabilization, the second stage - stable economic growth would be automatically reached by the 
self-creation of efficient markets and institutions, and socially accepted norms of behaviour. The 
monetarists' hypotheses that efficient institutions must arise because of natural selection and that all 
institutions and society will be rational in their actions have not proven to be true.  
 
The practice showed that inefficient development can be self-supporting, self-developing and stable, 
especially in those countries which stayed under communist regime for a longer time. The consequences 
of the economic reforms in these countries were unexpected by many experts, whatever guideline 
direction of the reform process you would look at, mostly because of a mixture of aims with instruments, 
and neglecting the transformation costs and institutional traps effect on the reforms. Let's numerate the 
most important of these:  
 
The rush to bring the prices under control produced a system of mutual arrears and provoked a shift 
towards barter trading, which actually meant that a non-monetary economy took shape on a new basis. 
Attempts to change the tax-collecting system gave a boost to shadow economy development. The 
slackening of state control over cash flows – a measure expected to create a competitive economic 
environment – fueled corruption. Lowering inflation and stabilizing prices didn't bring the cost of capital 
down and more available to the real sector of economy. Decrease and tight control of the budget deficit 
didn't result in a growth-oriented structure of expenditures and stability in budget incomes, but to a 
simultaneous decrease in both of them. Creation of the most developed financial sector in transition 
countries only in some cases caused an essential effect on the real economy and lending to small and 
medium size enterprises in other cases was one of the primary reasons for financial crises and 
disproportions in economic development. Stability of domestic exchange rate doesn't bring about growth of 
domestic production and export, but rather to stagnation of the economy and an increase in the foreign 
trade deficit thus making foreign exchange rate a long-term hostage of stability of prices and low inflation 
targets. The "shock privatization" campaign, instead of producing efficient private property holders, gave 
birth to a great number of inefficient organizations, a decrease of activity and in many cases to plundering 
and selling of the assets of privatized objects. All these changes were accompanied by an unforeseen and 
uncommonly sharp production decline, dramatic increase in unemployment and sharp polarization of the 
income structure within society.  
 
Many of these unexpected phenomena are known as institutional traps. They are responsible for the 
misfortune of the economic reforms in many transition countries, including Armenia. The analysis shows 
that the formation of transformation costs and institutional traps are major risks in any reform process, and 
avoidance of these traps is an urgent task during transition. Major institutional traps are barter, mutual 
arrears, tax evasion, and corruption. Transformation costs are increased through the linkage effect and 
can support an originally inefficient norm even when the coordination effect stops working. Once fallen into 
an institutional trap, the system chooses a non-efficient path of development, and with time, returning to 
efficient development may not make sense any longer. Moreover, a system with a prevalent efficient norm, 
if strongly disturbed (with the set of equilibria, however, remaining structurally unchanged), may fall into an 
institutional trap in which it will remain even after the disturbing factor is removed. This is the so-called 
"hysteresis effect", which is typical to all norm-forming processes, including those involving institutional 
traps.  
 
Each institutional transformation should be preceded by efforts to forecast and forestall possible 
institutional traps. Such efforts should became part and parcel of preparations for any kind of reform. 
Transformation costs should be taken into account. The right choice of the rate and sequence of reforms, 
and wise industrial policy are prerequisites of institutional trap avoidance. But if a trap is formed, the task 
of breaking out of it turns out to be very difficult. Related theory hasto be developed yet. Standard 
temptation is the imposition of much harsher sanctions for deviation from socially efficient norms. Such 
strategy may imply considerable expenditures and is capable of generating even worse institutional traps. 
However it is quite possible that new reforms have to be conducted to get out of institutional traps. The 
measures should be directed to weaken coordination, linkage, and inertia effects supporting the traps, to 
increase their transaction costs, and to decrease transformation costs and transaction costs of efficient 
norms. 
 
Experience with large-scale transformations reveal an important and specific aspect of macroeconomic 
policy in economies in transition. If market mechanism is well developed, macroeconomic policy influences 
mostly macroeconomic indicators such as exchange rate, inflation, or GDP. For a country with unstable 
institutional structures, macroeconomic impact is capable of altering that structure. In Armenia, the 
standard receipt for fighting inflation-tough monetary policy promoted the formation of institutional traps.  
 
 Macroeconomic Indicators  1995 1996 1997 1998  1999  
GDP at constant prices (% change)  6.9 5.9 3.3 7.2 3.3 
Consumer prices  176.7 18.8 13.8 8.7 0.6 
Trade balance (US$ millions)  -403.4 -565.5 -660.8 -681.9 -611.1 
Current account (% of GDP)  -37.5 -29.7 -27.8 -27.1 -20.4 
Foreign Debt (% of GDP)  29.0 32.5 39.1 38.9 45.4 
Foreign Reserves (months of 
imports)  1.8 2.3 3.0 3.6 4.2 
Exchange Rate dram/USD (period 
average)  405.9 413.4 490.0 504.9 535.1 
 Interest Rates (%, annual rate)         
(*) 91-days Treasury Bill  37.9 45.1 52.9 44.6 53.8 
(*) 3 months Banks Loans (in drams)  69.6 57.1 49.1 39.3 
State Budget (% of GDP)         
(*) Deficit  11.0 9.3 4.7 3.7 5.2 
(*) Revenues  17.8 15.1 16.4 18.5 20.2 
(*) Expenditures  28.8 24.4 21.1 22.1 25.4 
 
